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CAN LOAN DESCRIPTIONS PREDICT THE FUNDING 
PROBABILITY IN A PEER TO PEER LENDING 
PLATFORM? 
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Akil Boney-Gill 
EC-375 
Research Question: How do loan descriptions predict the funding probability in a peer to peer 
lending platform and how can spelling errors found in loan descriptions be used to make up for 
asymmetric information? 
Abstract 
The purpose of this empirical study is to determine if the orthographic quality of the 
description of a loan's purpose predict the total funding probability in a peer to peer lending 
platform. I hypothesize that the data I collect will show a negative correlation between spelling 
errors in loan descriptions and probability that the entire loan will be funded.  
Introduction 
Peer to peer lending is the loaning of money to individuals or small businesses through 
online services that match lenders (investors) directly with borrowers (loan applicants) (similar 
to crowdfunding). Within the peer to peer lending market, there exists asymmetric information 
due to the fact that lenders have no clue what type of borrowers they are dealing with. Lenders 
have no idea whether a borrower is good for making loan payments. The question I am trying to 
answer is, are lenders using spelling errors in loan descriptions (an optional brief summary or 
few sentences placed in by a loan application by borrowers, explaining in more detail why they 
are requesting a loan) to compensate for the asymmetric information present in peer to peer 
lending markets? And can spelling errors determine funding probability?  
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 One of the most relevant pieces of literature that I have come across that is related to my 
research question is " Small Business Borrowing and Peer-to-Peer L nding: Ev dence from 
Lending Club" This research paper investigates the ability of borrowers and lenders to signal to 
each other in the peer to peer lending market. Researchers focus on small business loans and 
investigate the relationship between the loan description provided by borrowers and the impact 
of this description on the potential funding of the loan by lenders. Researchers find that the loan 
descriptions provided in loan applications can be used to predict the probability that the entire 
loan will be funded, similar to what my research question is trying to answer.  
 Using data from the Lending Club website, determine what key words are most likely to 
result in a project being funded. Then look at what key words are most important in terms of 
determining which investments are the most successful, where we define success as the loan 
eventually being repaid.  
 What distinguishes my research from this research paper is that, this paper is detecting 
for key words in the loan description that impact lender decisions, while my research question on 
the other hand is detecting spelling errors. 
 Securing the necessary credit and capital funding are some of the most difficult 
challenges individuals face when attempting to start a small business. When these individuals 
have a hard time securing funding from banks or other traditional institutions, they now have the 
choice to visit the many different crowdfunding websites to obtain the necessarily funds. "Since 
the invention of online peer to peer (P2P) lending websites, P2P lending has become an 
increasingly popular way for entrepreneurs to secure funds to start their small business, and there 
is a growing literature examining how these new funding sources have affected entrepreneurial 
activity." (Nowak, 2015) 
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 To conduct this analysis, researchers exploit data from Lending Club. These researchers 
collected loan data from June 2007 to June 2014. The data set includes all information that is 
available to the lender. 
 Funding and text data presented unique challenges for researchers and required specific 
econometric techniques. Researchers are interested in the signaling function of loan descriptions, 
it is necessary to incorporate this text or character variable into the analysis. Methods for 
statistical analysis of text fall into the category of textual analysis. One approach used for 
incorporating the loan description required the researchers to pre-specify a list of words that they 
believed were significant and created indicator variables for each word, a procedure that is 
referred to as the bag of words method in the relevant literature. 
 This study investigates the ability of borrowers and lenders to signal to each other in a 
peer to peer lending market. We have shown that loan characteristics and the information that 
borrowers provide in the form of a loan description are useful in determining which loans are 
funded by investors. Simple statistics such as the number of words or characters in a loan 
description are shown to significantly impact the funding decision. We find that more words or 
characters in a loan description will decrease the probability of funding. In their results, these 
researchers also found that an index created from a textual analysis of the loan description can be 
used to forecast the performance of the loan. Their results show that 1 standard deviation 
increase in the index will decrease the odds of default by 14%. Therefore, it appears as if 
investors are not making investment decisions based on improper signals. 
 
 
 The purpose of my research proposal is to determine how the presence of spelling errors 
in a loan description affect funding probability in a peer to peer lending platform. I am also 
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testing whether in the presence of spelling errors found in loan descriptions can be seen as a  
unintentional signal made by borrowers in their loan applications indicating how careless he or 
she is to potential lenders. I would like to know whether the aspects of a borrower's writing 
quality can make up for the asymmetric information present in the peer to peer lending market. I 
hypothesize that a borrower's carelessness with grammatical errors in their loan application may 
impact their chance of having their loan fully funded because writing quality will help 
compensate the lender for asymmetric information. For my research, I have analyzed data on 
loan descriptions and whether loans have been fully funded, which is presented on pe r to peer 
lending sites. This study is worth investing in, to understand the risks lenders and borrowers face 
in this market. I also hope that my findings will help me to develop suggestions for the owners of 
these peer to peer lending platforms on how they can get rid of the problem of asymmetric 
information. My results show that there is some negative correlation between spelling errors and 
the probability that the entire loan will be funded. Studying this may help discover how 
borrowers can ensure or at least increase their chance of having their loan request fully funded 
and help diminish the presence of asymmetric information. Throughout this paper, I will refer to 
several articles throughout this paper that provide evidence of discrimination within this market 
and other factors that may influence lenders willingness to let strangers borrow their money. 
 As my contribution to the research that is already out there regarding the determinants of 
loan funding probability and asymmetric information, is testing whether the presence of spelling 
errors impact the requested loan amount to the funded loan amount ratio. Another difference 
between my research question and previous research papers is that, I focus on errors in the loan 
description and other research questions focus on keywords. 
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 Throughout the remainder I this paper you will be guided through the process that I went 
through to make this research possible. Section 2 reviews literature, section 3 discusses my 
analytical framework, section 4 discusses my methodology, section 5 concludes with a 
discussion of my results and future prospect, section 6 is summary of robustness checks, and I 
end this paper with a collection tables that explain my data. 
Section 2: Literature Review 
Description-text related soft information in peer-to-peer lending – Evidence from two 
leading European platforms 
The study of (Dorfleitner, 2016) looks at how soft information presented in borrowers' loan 
descriptions plays a role in successful funding probability. In particular, researchers focus their 
time on the orthography of the loan description, including text length and the presence of social 
and emotional keywords. The authors of this article focus their investigation on two German peer 
to peer lending platforms, Smava and Auxmoney. To make this study possible, researchers used 
a unique set of controls, comprising soft information (material that cannot be verified or 
confirmed, such as feelings, perceptions, opinions and values) presented by text characteristics 
and the borrower's loan description provided within the loan application. Some examples of soft 
information presented in the loan application are pictures, personal experiences, or commonly 
used emotion evoking keywords. They also assess the profitability of the investments, which 
provides a quantitative link between the willingness to fund, the danger of default and the 
rationality of the investors. By using two differently designed platforms, one that requires a 
credit score (Smava) and one that does not (Auxmoney), they could obtain insights into the 
question of how the value of soft information depends on the presence or absence of hard 
information (material that can be verified). The study splits hard and soft information into 
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categories, then further separate variables that fall under these categories into sub categories, for 
example, the loan purpose and keywords commonly found within the loan application as soft 
information, and income as hard information. 
The results that this study concluded that lenders using Auxmoney gain a higher return and 
lower default rates compared to Smava. Smava requires a minimum credit score for all loan 
applicants, therefore lenders have some basis to go from when determining whether they want to 
fund a loan. The results of this research also indicate that soft information play a small role in 
explaining the funding probability on Smava but hard information is a better determinant of 
whether lenders will fund a loan. In contrast to Auxmoney, where the providing a credit score is 
not mandatory and very few loans get fully funded. On Auxmoney, it appears that some soft 
information related to description text have a significant impact on funding probability, while 
only few of them show significant impact on probability of a borrower defaulting. Keywords that 
induce positive emotions also show significantly correlation with probability of the funding 
success. Another variable researcher investigate that is used on both platforms, is interest rate. In 
the loan applications on these platforms, borrowers provide a suggested maximum interest rate 
he or she is willing to pay, then the borrower and potential lender try to agree on an optimal 
interest rate. The results indicate that lenders associate higher interest rates with a lower chance 
of borrowers being able to pay off their loan.  Therefore, lenders tend to away from loan requests 
from a borrower that comes with a high interest rate. 
 
 
What's in a picture? 
 The authors of this article were set on determining whether there is racial discrimination 
within peer to peer lending platforms. Their desire to perform such a study comes from belief 
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that because of discrimination towards certain groups of people in other environments, for 
example, blacks and women may not enjoy the same access to markets and opportunities as their 
counterparts.  
 I chose this article although it is not entirely related to my research question, because it 
points out physical appearances which is another factor that can be a determinant as to whether a 
borrower receives loan funding. This research article helped me develop my own research 
question during my brainstorming period for deciding how to uniquely construct my own 
research question. 
 According to the literature, theories of discrimination typically fall within either 
statistical discrimination (which is economically efficient for decision makers) or taste-based 
discrimination (which comes from hostility toward one group versus other groups of people and 
is often costly to the decision makers). When borrowers create their profile on a peer to peer 
lending platform they are given the choice to upload photos and other optional information 
(explanation as to how important the loan is to the individual or why they deserve the loan) that 
they believe may enhance the probability of having their loan funded. 
 This paper examines discrimination within peer to peer lending markets, and uses 
Prosper.com (a leader in online peer to peer lending in the United States) as the main source of 
data. The loan listings provided by Prosper.com included links to the pictures uploaded to a 
borrower's profile. Researchers coded variables from pictures and text descriptions that they 
exploited from prosper.com provided by loan applications that were posted from 2006 to 2007 in 
order to successfully conduct their investigation. In order to test for 'disparate treatment' of 
certain groups researchers estimate whether they are treated differently than their counterparts 
who are similar on other dimensions. 
8	
	
 The empirical analysis reveals significant racial discrimination in this market. 
Researchers estimated that "listings with blacks in the picture are 2.4-3.2 percentage points less 
likely to be funded, much less than the average probability of being funded which is 9.3 percent. 
This signifies approximately a 30 percent reduction in the likelihood of receiving funding." 
(Pope, 2011) Research also found that listings where the borrower expresses a desire to pay 
down credit-card debt (one of the most popular stated loan purposes at the time) over credit 
requests for other purposes, such as loans for business expansions or automotive repairs or 
purchases to be favored within this market. 
 Researchers found the evidence of racial discrimination quite shocking when taking into 
account the fact that borrowers provide so much information about themselves in their credit 
profile, including credit grade, debt-to-income ratio, and a measure of income. In the end 
researchers found that lenders are more responsive to signals about race than they are to the 
abundance of credit history provided by individual borrowers. 
 The evidence is consistent with a combination of accurate statistical discrimination 
against blacks coupled with taste-based discrimination against whites. "Perhaps the most likely 
interpretation is that lenders understand the correlations between race and important 
characteristics for predicting default that they cannot perfectly observe, such as education and 
social- support networks, but they fail to fully appreciate the strength of these correlations or the 
importance of these unobservable factors in predicting default." (Pope, 2011) 
Tell Me a Good Story and I May Lend You Money: The Role of Narratives in Peer-to-Peer 
Lending Decisions 
This research of (Herzenstein, 2011) inspects how identity claims presented by borrowers 
on their online peer to peer lending profile influence lender decisions in funding their loans on 
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the platform. More specifically, this research examines how borrower's self-presentation and 
identification content in their loan applications impact lender decisions, and predict the default 
probability borrowers whose loans have been fully funded. By collecting data from Prosper.com, 
the authors of this article found that soft information (unverifiable identity claims and other 
information that cannot be verified through credit reports) also has an impact on a lender's 
decisions not only hard (verifiable) information. Similar to my research question this article aims 
at determining how text related information in loan applications affect the probability that the 
entire loan will be funded, and therefore, it has given me some guidelines to go by when writing 
my paper. 
The straightforward process of peer to peer lending process through begins with soon-to-
be borrowers giving prosper.com the authorization to verify some of their personal information 
(such as, credit score, income, and job occupation). After analyzing this information made 
available to prosper.com, each individual borrower is designated a letter grade that reflects their 
riskiness of the borrower defaulting on loan payments. Letter grades range from AA (implying 
that the borrower is very low risk of defaulting on their loan payments), through A, B, C, D, and 
E to HR, which represents borrowers with the highest chance of defaulting on loan payments.  
After this process borrowers are finally free to post loan requests for auction, capped at $25,000. 
They also have the option of adding a text description or anything they may want lenders to 
know in an open text-area made available; and this will be the borrowers narrative.  
According to the literature, when lenders review loan applications they may be 
discouraged by grammatical errors or the profile of a person that identifies with a certain group 
of people that have stereotypical stigma attached to them. For example, if lenders see the 
application of an African American man they may just assume that he is lazy and poor and will 
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default on payments, regardless of the letter grade the applicant was assigned by the peer to peer 
lending platform. 
Narratives provided by borrowers are useful to potential lenders in this market because a 
narrative gives meaning to events that unfold around the borrower. For example, a narrative 
might explain a person’s past experiences, current situation, or future hopes. Researchers 
conducted a study on Prosper.com. On peer to peer lending sites, borrowers and lenders do not 
meet in person, therefore, researchers can assess the role of narratives in overcoming the 
uncertainty that arises during financial transactions between unacquainted actors. 
Discrimination in Lending Markets: Status and the Intersections of Gender and Race 
 
 According to researchers, lenders in traditional and peer to peer lending markets tend to 
discriminate between loan applicants, but the knowledge about the mechanisms driving lenders 
behavior is still a mystery. When lenders assess borrowers they are guided by cultural 
stereotypes about the borrowers' status. This persuades lenders toward funding higher status 
groups even when applicants have the same financial histories. The researchers examine how 
applicants’ demographic characteristics combine to alter lenders’ status assessments and, 
thereby, lenders’ decisions in an artificial peer to peer lending market. This study provides 
experimental evidence that status is a likely driving force in lending discrimination. "These 
markets have a high degree of uncertainty because traditional indicators of creditworthiness, 
such as a credit score and past financial behavior more generally, are not perfect indicators of 
future behaviors and environments." Given this uncertain situation, researchers proposed that 
lenders’ decisions may be guided by cultural status beliefs about the applicants’ most noticeable 
population structural characteristics. This research paper shares similarities to the article "What's 
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in the picture?" (Harkness, 2016), because they both indicate that discrimination exists within the 
peer to peer lending market. 
 According to data gathered from the 1991 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, blacks and Hispanics were about 82 percent less likely to 
receive housing loans from banks than comparable whites (Munnell et al. 1996). Researchers 
predicted that lenders will be more willing to provide funding to borrowers who are advantaged 
by their status characteristics, gender and race in particular. 
Hypothesis 1: Borrowers’ status will mediate the relationship between their gender and race and 
lenders’ funding decisions. 
 "When both gender and race are salient, the multiple jeopardy hypothesis (argues ha  
class, racial, ethnic, and gender inequalities carry on in later life and that groups who are 
disadvantaged by these dimensions of inequality in midlife e.g., women or people of color face 
increasing disadvantages in older age. Alternatively, the leveling hypothesis suggests that people 
who are privileged in early life have more to lose in later life, and that a leveling out of resources 
takes place)." (Harkness, 2016) 
Hypothesis 2: Black women will be less likely to receive funding than black men, white women, 
and white men. 
Hypothesis 3: Black women will be more likely to receive funding than black men and white 
women.  
EMPIRICAL TEST: The author tested these hypotheses with an experiment recreating aspects 
of lending markets. This study mimicked the peer-to-peer (P2P) lending model, including its 
environment, conditions, and borrower profiles, as trained and untrained lenders alike may 
engage in Peer-to-peer lending. 
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 Borrower profiles: The author developed the borrower profiles by drawing on actual 
listings posted in prosper. com’s marketplace. Peer to peer loan applications generally contain a 
description of the borrower's purpose. On prosper.com, every loan applicant is assigned letter 
ratings for their loans, ranging from AA (lower risk, lower return) to HR (higher risk, higher 
return), roughly corresponding to their credit score. To control for financial history, all applicants 
in this study had the second highest grade of ‘‘B.’’ 
 “Estimated returns are calculated by (i) taking the weighted average borrower interest 
rate for all loans originated during the period, adding (ii) estimated collected late fees and post 
charge-off principal recovery for such loans, and subtracting (iii) the servicing fee, estimated 
uncollected interest on charge-offs and estimated principal loss on charge-offs from such loans. 
The actual return on any Note depends on the prepayment and delinquency pattern of the loan 
underlying each Note, which is highly uncertain. Individual results may vary and projections can 
change. Past performance is no guarantee of future results and the information presented is not 
intended to be investment advice or a guarantee about the performance of any Note. Based on 
data from October 31, 2016 - November 8, 2016.” – Prosper 
 To vary the gender (male or female) and race (white or black) of the applicants, the 
author developed avatar pictures for each listing. These controlled the presence of various status 
cues (e.g., age and socioeconomic signals) so applicants differed only by gender and race. 
"Participants were informed the avatars were based on pictures provided by the real borrowers, 
with the avatars used instead to protect the identity of the applicants." 
Dependent Measures  
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-Status. To measure the applicants’ perceived status, participants rated each borrower on 9-point 
scales ranging from not at all to extremely according to whether they were competent, capable, 
organized, skilled, and responsible. 
-Lending decisions. Participants indicated how likely each borrower was to repay the loan and 
how likely they would be to fund each applicant on 100-point scales. Next, participants were 
endowed with a hypothetical $1,000 to potentially lend (none, some, or all) to each borrower.  
-Multivariate Method. The author employ mixed-effects linear regression as this study used a 
repeated-measures design, making responses dependent. A random intercept term designated by 
each participant’s unique identification number is included to properly model the grouping 
structure of these data. All models include a categorical variable indicating the borrowers’ 
gender and race (black female omitted), the presence of writing errors (dummy; with errors = 1), 
and loan type (dummy; debt consolidation = 1). The participants’ gender (dummy; female = 1), 
racial/ethnic background (black non-Hispanic, Hispanic, Asian, other; white omitted), age 
(grand-mean centered), level of education (ranging from 1 = some high school to 8 = 
professional degree), marital status (dummy; married = 1), and level of economic conservatism 
(ranging from 0 = extremely liberal to 100 = extremely conservative; mean = 51.63, SD = 28.74) 
are also included in all models. 
 This research paper provides for me an example of another peer to per lending platform 
in the U.S. and gives me a better understanding of how the industry functions. 
Determinants of Default in P2P Lending  
 Lenders in the peer to peer lending market are held at a disadvantage compared to the 
borrowers due to the problem of information asymmetry. For this reason, peer to peer lending 
sites provide potential lenders with hard information about borrowers and a loan description 
indicating the purpose of their loan.  
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 The first research question of this paper aims at analyzing factors that influence defaults 
on loan payments in peer to peer lending. A common trait for peer to peer lending businesses is 
that they bear less transaction costs than traditional banking corporations, due to their simpler 
business model that does not have strict banking regulations and puts borrowers in contact with 
lenders. Some similarities shared between traditional banking corporations and peer to peer 
lending markets are costs, for example, customer evaluation costs before the loan is approved. 
On top of that, there are costs involved in monitoring loan payment and loan recovery costs. 
Since peer to peer loans are not accounted on the books of the peer to peer lending platform, no 
liability for loans is needed.  
 "Peer to peer loans are not accounted on the books of the peer to peer lending platform, 
so no liability for the loans is needed. It does not experience financial frictions due to the 
coexistence of long term loans and short term deposits." (Serrano, 2015) With that being said, 
the utilization of the internet is not only for peer to peer lending, but also for online banking 
because computerization reduces manual processes that would otherwise increase efficiency. 
Bank's operating costs are one of the major factors that influence interest margins, because banks 
pass on the cost of operating to their clients. Due to peer to peer lending platforms having low 
intermediation costs, the efficiency is transferred to users as higher revenue for lenders and 
lowered interest rates for borrowers, compared to conventional financial institutions. 
Is Crowdfunding Different? Evidence on the Relation between Gender and Funding 
Success from a German Peer-to-Peer Lending Platform 
 According to previous research on traditional banking, lenders often discriminate against 
women that apply for loans. However, studies of peer to peer lending platforms in the United 
States find that women who request loans have a better chance of receiving fully loans than do 
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men. Researchers use data from smava.com regarding the successfulness of women's loan 
applications to answer their question of whether a relationship exists between gender and 
funding probability. The conclusion that researchers came to, show that there is no relationship 
between gender and an individual borrower’s chance to receive funds on peer to peer lending 
platform. "Several robustness checks confirm this finding. Hence, female discrimination seems 
to be eased by the ‘wisdom of the lending crowd’." (Barasinska, 2014) 
Group social capital and lending outcomes in the financial credit market: An empirical 
study of online peer-to-peer lending 
 The peer to peer lending market has no financial intermediaries; which researchers 
believe leads to the problem of asymmetry. Due to the problem of asymmetric information, 
researchers believe that lenders and borrowers using the market encounter less favorable lending 
outcomes, for example, high default rate. Researchers studied the relationship between 
individual's group social capital and their funding probability in a peer to peer lending market. 
"Despite its ability to facilitate economic exchange, social capital as public goods may also cause 
free-rider problems, particularly in an online environment. Based on the analyses of transaction 
data collected from one of the largest online peer to peer lending platform in the U.S., we found 
that the borrower’s general group social capital (i.e., group membership) and relational social 
capital (i.e., group credibility and verifiability, and group trust) yielded inconsistent effects, and 
the borrower’s structural social capital (i.e., group inclusiveness) had a negative impact on, 
his/her funding and repayment performance." (Chen, 2016) "The friendship networks of 
borrowers have been found to be positively associated with the likelihood of their loans getting 
funded, and negatively related to the interest rate and default risk on funded loans." (Chen, 2016) 
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This article is where I developed the idea of using the lemons market theory to explain the 
asymmetric information within the peer to peer lending market. 
Competition for Lending in the Internet Era: The case of Peer-to-Peer Lending 
Marketplaces in the USA 
 Peer to peer online markets build an example of a two-sided market as they attract and 
match lenders and borrowers. In this article, researchers provide a descriptive analysis on the 
competitive strategies used by these platforms, in a two-sided market environment, and they try 
to find whether these two platforms differentiate from each other or from banks. To provide 
evidence on this comparison, researchers collect data Prosper.com and LendingClub.com, the 
two leading peer to peer lending platforms in the U.S. Researchers concluded that these 
platforms are substitutes with one another and that they are frontally competing. This article 
more closely defines the peer to peer lending industry and gave me a better understanding of the 
market. (Mariotto) 
 
Trust and Credit: The Role of Appearance in Peer-to-peer Lending 
 
 "Although it is well known that appearance-based impressions affect labor market and 
election outcomes, little is known about the role appearance plays in financial transactions." 
(Duarte, 2012) Researchers address this question using photographs of potential borrowers from 
a peer to peer lending site. Consistent with the trust-intensive nature of lending, researchers 
found that borrowers who appeared more trustworthy were more likely of having their loans 
funded. Moreover, borrowers who appeared more trustworthy had higher credit scores and 
defaulted on loans less often. Overall, our findings suggested that impressions of trustworthiness 
matter in financial transactions as they predict lender's and borrower's behavior. This journal 
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article reveals what other factors that I may have overlooked that can determine a lender's 
willingness to fund loans. 
The influence of parafoveal typographical errors on eye movements in reading. European 
Journal of Cognitive Psychology 
The research covers three experiments requiring comprehensive reading, which analyzes the 
impact typographical errors in parafoveal vision has on the time it takes to inspect with foveal 
vison and saccade targeting. During each experiment, researchers altered the presentation of 
words to produce the appearance of typographical errors, then adjusted them for foveal 
inspection. For the first experiment, researchers created errors by altering the presentation of 
words by replacing the first letter of word with a repeated appearance of its second letter. 
Although, there were no observed significant impacts on foveal inspection time. During the 
second experiment the target 1 skipping effect was taken out because of orthographic illegality 
and showed shorter foveal inspection times as a function of the presence of the error. Lastly, the 
third experiment influenced lexical and sublexical properties of the parafoveal typing error. 
Properties of the parafoveal error again influenced priorfoveal inspection times. Results 
suggested that the determining properties were sublexical rather than lexical. (Pynte, 2004) 
 
 
Do Social Networks Solve Information Problems for Peer-to-Peer Lending? Evidence from 
Prosper.com 
 Researchers used transaction data collected from prosper.com between June 1, 2006 and 
July 31, 2008, to determine what information problems exist on this peer to peer lending site and 
whether social networks help alleviate the information problems. The collected data, narrows 
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down three causes of information problems. The first cause is the presence of adverse selection 
for lenders due to the fact that borrower's credit/ letter grades are made available rather than their 
credit scores. This selection is partially offset when Prosper posts more detailed credit 
information on the website. Second, a large portion of lenders make mistakes in the loan 
selection process but they eventually learn through trial and error. Third, the presence of high 
interest rates typically implies a lower rate of return because higher interest rates attract lower 
quality borrowers. This article is relevant to my research because this is where I developed the 
idea to look for informational problems lurking within the peer to peer lending market. 
 Based on existing literature on micro-finance theories, social networks might be able to 
identify riskiness of a borrower either due to friends and associates who observe the essential 
type of borrower's predictable habits or due to the monitoring within social networks which 
provides a stronger incentive to pay off loans based on actual results. Findings show results in 
favor of this argument and in opposition of it at the same time. The results produced show that 
loans endorsed and bid on by friends had less missed payments and yielded higher rates of return 
than other loans. 
 
Herding behavior in online P2P lending: An empirical investigation 
 This article is relevant to my research question because researchers investigate lender 
behavior in the peer to peer (P2P) lending market of Korea, where individuals bid on unsecured 
microloans requested by other individual borrowers. Online peer to peer exchanges are on a 
steady growth rate, even though these lenders in this market are not professional investors. In 
addition, lenders are taking very big risks because loans in peer to peer lending are granted 
without any kind of security. While the peer to peer lending market shares some characteristics 
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of other online markets with respect to herding behavior, it also has characteristics that may 
discourage it.  
 This study empirically examines herding behavior in the peer to peer lending market 
where seemingly conflicting conditions and features of herding are present. Researchers use a 
large sample of daily data from one of the largest peer to peer lending platforms in Korea and 
find relevant evidence of herding and its diminishing marginal effect as bidding advances within 
the peer to peer lending market. The findings of this paper suggest that herding in the market is 
unwise and lenders should not follow in the footsteps of others. Researchers use a multinomial 
logit market-share model in which relevant variables from prior studies on peer to peer lending 
are assessed. 
Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards 
 Licensing occurs in a variety of professions: doctors, lawyers, barbers, real-estate 
salesmen, contractors, accountants, and stockbrokers for example. They must all pass state 
examinations believed to assure a minimum level of competence. 
 Minimum quality standards are not limited to professions. Many consumer products, such 
as drugs and other potentially hazardous products must satisfy federal safety standards. Banks' 
and insurance companies' portfolios are subject to frequent examination for their "soundness." 
And there is agitation for minimum quality standards in a number of currently unregulated 
markets, from baby pajamas to TV repairmen. 
 Is there an economic justification for regulating quality? Not in traditional theory: 
devotees of this theory explain the existence of licensing and other minimal quality standards 
either as misguided economic paternalism or as a means - tacitly controlled by industry or 
professional representatives - to capture monopoly profits. 
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 But it is not clear that traditional economic tools are adequate for investigating the 
licensing problem in its full complexity. "Markets which have minimum quality standards tend 
to be characterized by informational asymmetry, in which the seller knows the quality of his 
service or product, but the buyer does not." This article is relevant to my research question 
because it gives me a better understanding of the lemons market theory. It is difficult, for 
example, for a patient to ascertain the exact quality of a physician's services or for a housewife 
(or househusband) to verify the radiation leakage of a microwave oven. Thus, uncertainty and 
differences in information seem to characterize markets with licensing or other forms of 
minimum quality standards, and, until recently, these aspects of markets have been outside the 
purview of economic theory.  
Effects of Spelling Errors on the Perception of Writers. The Journal of General Psychology 
 This research papers aims at answering several questions, but the main question 
researchers of this article are trying to answer is, "can our perceptions of other people be 
influenced by their spelling ability?" The purpose/interest that lies behind this research question 
is the curiosity of whether a reader that comes across spelling errors uses that to determine how 
he or she views the author. Researchers found evidence showing that perception of another 
person's intelligence can sometimes be associated with the smallest amount of information about 
that individual, for example, a person's writing skills. Readers may view poor writing skills as an 
indicator of the author being poorly educated or unintelligent. 
 One of the main questions this research paper aims at answering is, whether spelling 
errors are taken as an indication of low intellectual abilities in general, are they attributed to low 
verbal skills in particular, or do we not take spelling errors to reflect other cognitive abilities at 
all? For this research paper, investigators found college students to volunteer for their study, 
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which required them to read essays, some containing spelling errors and others spelling error 
free, and after reading it, share their perceptions of the author after reading the essay. 
Researchers hypothesized that the authors of the essays that contained no spelling errors would 
be viewed as being/having high cognitive and intellectual skills, compared to the authors of 
essays that were filled with spelling errors. 
 Researchers were also curious as to whether spelling ability is perceived as an indicator 
for writing skills, or is it also seen as a reflection of general intellectual skills? They 
hypothesized that the presence and abundance of spelling errors would impact college student's 
ratings of the author's writing skills and general intellectual ability. 
 The paper also discusses whether spelling errors in a writing piece impacts the reader's 
perception of the writer's level of intellect. The paper suggests that readers associate spelling 
ability with intelligence. 
 If perception of the writer’s intellectual agility is affected by the presence of spelling 
errors, it would be useful to know whether spelling ability is actually correlated with intelligence. 
In order to test whether there is a correlation between intellectual ability and the spelling ability, 
researchers measured the correlation between spelling ability and the scores on a brief 
intelligence test.  
 Researchers investigated the perceived relationship between spelling ability (which was 
measured by a standard oral dictation spelling test) and cognitive skills by performing three 
experiments that examined whether college students' ratings of an authors' intellectual ability 
(measured by scores on a brief intelligence test), logical ability, and writing skills were affected 
by the presence of spelling errors. 
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 The first experiment involved the presented 4 spelling errors in a short essay given to 
college students to read, and surprisingly did not significantly affect ratings. Results also found a 
correlation between spelling ability of college students, and cognitive skills. In the second 
experiment, college students rated the author of a short essay as having less ability due to the 
abundance of spelling errors. The impact spelling errors had on the ratings of writing skills was 
more noticeable and distinct than it was on the ratings of logical ability and intellectual ability. In 
the third experiment, this finding was replicated, in which the essay included misspellings that 
were made by real writers. The responses from these college students indicate that they associate 
spelling errors with a person's abilities, but more so with writing skills than intellectual and 
logical abilities. The results of these experiments suggest that spelling errors have some impact 
on how people are perceived based on knowledge of their writing alone, especially when spelling 
errors are prevalent in their writing.  
 This research paper is relevant to my topic because it also addresses the idea that writing 
quality has an impact on people's perception of others. 
Didn't You Run the Spell Checker? Effects of Type of Spelling Error and Use of a Spell 
Checker on Perceptions of the Author. Reading Psychology 
 The research this article focuses on uses college students to investigate the perception of 
writer's choice to proofread writing for spelling errors when using a word processor. 
Undergraduate students volunteered to be a part of the test which required them to read essays 
and afterwards, complete questionnaire regarding their perceptions of the author and the quality 
of their writing. Spelling errors were narrowed down to three sub categories (no error, 
homophone error, non-homophone error) and information was provided about the author's usage 
of spell checkers when using word processor (no information, author did not use a spell checker, 
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author did use a spell checker). When the undergraduate students read the essay and came across 
non-homophone spelling errors, which are usually detected by a spell checker tool, that in turn 
impacted their perception of the author’s abilities and the quality of the essay negatively. The 
student participants placed the blame entirely on the author of the text for failing to write a 
spelling error free essay. The final results propose that a person's opinions about a writer and 
their writing is influenced by the amount and type of spelling errors detected in the text. 
Researchers concluded that readers of a text hold its author responsible for any spelling errors, 
regardless of whether there are spell checker tools available or not. 
The Economics of Information, Frictions, and Consumer Behavior  
 This research concerns the effects of informational frictions on consumer behavior, 
focusing on consumer search and the use of the internet. The book examines how geography can 
impact behavior on peer to peer lending markets. Extensive literature on the traditional credit 
market finds that investors and lenders are sensitive to their distance from the borrower, due to 
the cost of information gathering and monitoring. Recent empirical work has found mixed 
results. Researchers found that local lenders tend to bid earlier, bid larger amounts, and are more 
informed in the sense that they are better able to evaluate the underlying risk of borrowers. 
Lastly, I develop a simple model of social learning with heterogeneous agents that provides 
testable predictions. My results are consistent with this model; a listing with more early local 
bidding activity will attract more lenders, leading to a higher probability of funding and a lower 
final interest rate, if funded. 
 This work suggests that the behavioral differences between local and nonlocal lenders are 
driven mostly by informational frictions and not merely preferences. Local lenders are better 
informed because they have easier and cheaper access to information, and this asymmetry 
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contributes to explaining why geographic-based frictions are still present and relevant in online 
lending markets. The second chapter develops a dynamic model of consumer search that exploits 
intertemporal variation in within-period price and search cost distributions to estimate the 
population distribution from which consumers' search costs are initially drawn. Researchers 
show that static approaches to estimating this distribution generally suffer from a dynamic 
sample selection bias because forward-looking consumers may delay their purchase in a way that 
depends on their individual search cost. They analyze identification of the population search cost 
distribution using only price data and develop estimable nonparametric bounds on the 
distribution function and a nonlinear least squares estimator for parametric models. Researchers 
apply our estimators to analyze the online market for two widely used econometrics textbooks.  
 "Our results suggest that static estimates of the search cost distribution are biased 
upwards, in a distributional sense, relative to the true population distribution. In a small-scale 
simulation study, we show that this is typical in a dynamic setting where consumers with high 
search costs are more likely to delay purchase than those with lower search costs. The third 
chapter examines consumer search behavior in the market for 3D enabled high definition 
televisions. Utilizing a newly develop methodology, I examine price dispersion in a vertically 
differentiated market and separately identify the effects of search friction and product 
differentiation on price. I estimate that 65.6% of the price variation in this market is explained by 
search friction with the rest being attributable to vertical differentiation. Furthermore, I find that 
the search intensity in this market polarized: 69% of consumers only search one store while 17% 
of consumers search all the stores. My analysis concludes that search frictions are relatively 
more important than vertical differentiation in explaining the price dispersion in the 3D HDTV 
market." (Senney, 2016) 
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Non-bank Financing in Ireland: A Comparative Perspective  
 This research paper provides a statistical overview that firms use non-bank financing in 
Ireland as well as a comparison vis-a-vis other Eurozone countries. It includes a wide variety of 
both non-bank debt finance (issued debt, trade credit, loans from friends/family/business 
partners, mezzanine debt and peer to peer lending/crowdfunding) as well as equity finance 
(venture capital, business angel and equity from friends and family and business partners). 
Researchers attempt to answer the following research questions: "(a) what firm characteristics 
are correlated with applications for, and usage of, specific types of bank finance? (b) What 
groups of firms or industries are more likely to apply for and use different types of non-bank 
finance? (c) Do Irish SMEs differ from other European enterprises and, if so, in what way? This 
overview should help provide evidence with which to understand the policy options available to 
diversify the financing options of Irish enterprises beyond their current reliance on bank 
lending." (O’TOOLE†T, 2015) 
 
Section 3: Analytical Framework 
 
 The economic model that I incorporate into my research is the Lemons Market theory 
which observes how the quality of traded goods in a market can diminish in the presence of 
asymmetric information between buyers and sellers. In the original model, the goods being 
traded are cars and only "lemons” (a metaphoric term for a car that is only discovered to be 
defective after you have bought it and taken it out of the lot).  
 In the peer to peer lending market, the information that is asymmetric is whether the 
borrower is good for repaying loans because only he or she knows their level of responsibility. 
Spelling error can be used as a signal to potential lenders (an unintentional signal that makes up 
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for asymmetric information) as the borrower's probability of defaulting on any loan payments 
and in the end determine whether a lender wants to fund the borrower's loan. I predict that 
spelling errors can be used as a representation of a borrower's carelessness. I predicted that after 
running my regressions, there would be a negative correlation between loan funding and spelling 
errors. Thus, by using the lemons market theory as the economic theory for my research 
question, I will be using spelling errors as my independent variable and loans as my dependent 
variable (the economic outcomes of peer to peer lending are commonly measured with funding 
performance such as funding success and repayment performance (or default probability)).  
 This empirical study builds on top of previous studies done on German peer to peer 
lending platforms (Auxmoney and Smava) by Figueredo and Varnhagen (2005) which finds that 
a text is inferior if it can be detected by a spellchecker. Therefore, I use Microsoft word's spell 
check as one of my methods to detect spelling errors and according to a study done by Pynte 
(2004), who says that orthography (the conventional spelling system of a language) makes a text 
difficult to interpret and therefore, potentially decreases the chance of successful loan funding. 
 Understanding what determines a lender's decision in funding a borrower's loans is an 
important theoretical analysis. In terms of research, there are limited studies that break down the 
nature of peer to peer lending in depth on a macro and micro level, due to it being a fairly new 
online lending industry. My methodology section describes data, its sources, my choice of 
variables and how I expect each independent variable to affect funding probability. 
According to Simon Cunningham, founder of Lending Memo ( U.S. based peer to peer 
lending platform), interest rates are determined by what borrowers are willing to pay and what 
investors are willing to earn. Cunningham also said, "it is entirely market-driven. The only thing 
that causes rates to move is investor and borrower demand in the platform." Interest rates in peer 
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to peer lending platforms are based on risk factors then categorized by several letter grades by 
LendingClub. Borrowers with the lowest interest rates tend to be those with the lowest risk of 
default and those with highest interest rates are the borrowers with the highest risk of default. 
The letter grading scale LendingClub uses organizes the grades from A to G, with "A" having 
the lowest interest rates and "G" having the highest interest rates.  
The higher interest rates accompanied by assigned letter grades can either be a 
compensation for the higher risk of default by the borrower or an incentive to make the loan 
appear more attractive for potential lenders. Interest rates also protects lenders against future 
rises due to inflation. 
The fact that interest rates in this market are risk-adjusted and interest rates for traditional 
banking systems are impacted by the Federal Reserve, separates peer to peer lending from 
traditional banking. Borrowers that tend to be attracted to peer to peer loans are borrowers who 
are looking for a better deal than credit cards.  
 According to Dorfleitner (2016), researchers were required to use an instrumental 
variable to resolve the problem endogeneity. "In our setting, the interest rate the borrowers are 
being charged can be subject to endogeneity because these rates are posted by the borrowers 
themselves while considering their own solvency. We account for this problem by applying 
simultaneous instrumental variable probit regressions estimated via maximum likelihood with 
the risk free interest rate as instrumental variable. A suitable instrument should explain a part of 
the variation of the dependent variable whereas it should not be directly related to the explained 
variable in the structural equation." (Dorfleitner, 2016) 
 I originally considered using a probit model because my research question and set up was 
similar enough to run a similar procedure, but the process would have taken too long. 
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Section 4: Methods 
Model 1: ( ) iLetterGAnnIncrSpellingEramntloan ebbbb ++++= 3210 ln_  
Model 2: ( ) iIntRtAnnIncrSpellingEramntloan ebbbb ++++= 3210 ln_  
 
 
 LendingClub (lendingclub.com) has a collection data gathered from loan applications 
provided by borrowers, including verified and unverified information, for example, loan 
description, home ownership status, work occupation and income. My data set consists of loan 
data collected from 100 loan descriptions on the peer to peer lending platform LendingClub from 
May 2007 to December 2007. 
 I have analyzed loan descriptions in order to derive several variables, which I have used 
to examine the relationship between spelling errors derived from the loan description and loan 
funding probability in a peer to peer lending platform. The orthographic quality of a description 
text is measured by one of the independent variable. The Spellingerror variable is derived using 
the automatic spelling check provided by Microsoft Word and grammarcheckforsentence.com 
which detects spelling and grammatical errors in a sentence when it is entered into the site. 
Furthermore, when necessary, I manually identified other incorrect spellings that cannot be 
detected by spell check programs mentioned, for example, abbreviations or names that are not 
stored in the spell check's dictionary. SpellingErr is an explanatory variable (a variable in which 
it is unclear as to whether it is independent). 
  
 
 To organize the data that, I gathered from LendingClub, I used a random number 
generator on a Microsoft excel spreadsheet to randomly select 100 different loan applications 
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provided by lendingclub.com from 2007. When I finished organizing the data, I realized that I 
overlooked the possibility that some borrowers did not provide a description for the purpose of 
their loan request. Therefore, I left the number of spelling errors in the loan descriptions blank 
for borrowers who failed to provide a description. 
For my research models, I use several variables that I exploit from loan applications 
made available on lendingclub.com. My independent variables are as follows: IntRt, which 
represents the nominal interest rate borrowers must pay on their loan; annual_inc, which is self-
reported annual income received; LetterG, which Letter grade assigned to each borrower 
depending on their level of riskiness; and lastly, ln(SpellingErr), which is measured by words in 
the loan description that are misspelled, not properly separated by a space, missing a 
capitalization, missing a hyphenation and misspelling that are homophone, which are detectable 
by Microsoft Word spell check and grammarcheckforsentence.com. These variables are also 
more narrowly defined in table 1 and table 2. 
Although, all variables were not immediately ready to be used in my regression. For 
example, the LetterG variable that I collected from lendingclub had to be converted from a letter 
to a numerical form so that it could be quantified/measured in the regression. Therefore, I 
assigned loan with letter grades of "A" to the number "1" gave lower letter grades higher 
numerical values ending with letter grade "G", giving it "7" (Table 4 lists the interest rates 
associated with assigned letter grades). Also, I was required to turn the variable for spelling 
errors into a semi log function (ln(SpellingErr)) in order to put the variable into a percentage, 
because if I had not the OLS estimates would have been too large and the results would not have 
made sense. My dependent variable loan_amnt accounts for the amount of money actually 
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funded to borrower divided by amount of money requested by borrower (probability that an 
entire loan will be funded). 
 In order to run regressions using loan descriptions, I needed to convert each loan 
description into a quantifiable representation/ value that could be read by Stata. Therefore, to 
more narrowly define loan descriptions, I started off by counting the amount of words in each 
loan description, then counting the amount of misspelled words and then dividing the total word 
count for the loan application by misspelled words.  
 The letter grades assigned to each individual by LendingClub work as a type of credit 
score. In this case I use letter grades as indicators of income/ financial stability; high letter grades 
will equate to high income/financially stable and individuals with low letter grades will equate to 
low income/ financially unstable. According to investopedia.com, a person's credit score shows 
whether he or she has a history of being financially stable.  
 Some psychological studies done by Figueredo and Varnhagen (2005) and Kreiner 
(2002) support the theory that spelling errors of a description text damage and lower the 
creditworthiness of the applicant in the eyes of the potential lender. "Other aspects are the 
signaling role of the text length and certain keywords appearing in the description. Some 
keywords that are able to evoke special emotions may have a positive effect on the probability of 
successful funding.” (Dorfleitner, 2016) 
A person’s economic status tends to reflect in their educational background, and people 
who come from low income backgrounds tend to have poorer academic skills. It is likely for 
lenders to discriminate against borrowers who present some obvious spelling errors in their loan 
description, and accurate statistical discrimination is economically efficient for the lender. 
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Section 5: Results  
 
 In this section, I first analyze the factors influencing the dependent variable, loan_amnt 
and second those regarding the default probability. After running the regressions on data for both 
model 1 and model 2, the findings that I encountered were not hat surprising. For results in both 
model 1 and model 2, I found that for every increase in the variable ln(SpellingErr) by 1 standard 
deviation, there would be a rounded up change of -.703 in the dependent variable loan_amnt. In 
other words, an increase in spelling errors by 1% would decrease the probability that an entire 
loan will be funded by 7.03% (See table 3). As I hypothesized, the data shows a negative 
correlation between spelling errors in loan descriptions and probability that an entire loan will be 
funded. This indicates that lenders may be using the amount of spelling errors that they find in a 
borrower's loan description as an additional way to determine their level of riskiness, and as a 
way to compensate for the existing asymmetric information in favor of these borrowers. Some of 
my findings also contradict some of the findings of the study done in "Small Business Borrowing 
and Peer-to-Peer Lending: Evidence from Lending Club", which concludes that it looks as if 
lenders do not make their decisions on whether to invest based on the unintentional signals made 
by borrowers, because their results show that an increase in a text index by 1 standard deviation 
causes the chances of borrowers defaulting to decrease by 14%. Although, some of my results do 
support some the conclusions made in "Small Business Borrowing and Peer-to-Peer Lending: 
Evidence from Lending Club", which finds that the loan descriptions provided by borrowers can 
be used to predict the probability that an entire loan will be funded. This proves that due to the 
presence of spelling errors found in loan descriptions, lenders are less willing to fund borrower's 
loans.  
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 This should serve as an incentive for borrowers to check over their loan descriptions for 
spelling errors because it would in their best interest to have a little spelling errors as possible to 
increase their chances of having their loan funded. Proper spelling makes borrower's loan 
requests more desirable to lenders. My research shows that orthographic quality of the 
description is of some importance to potential lenders in the market. One common error I found 
within many borrower's loan descriptions was that they did not end their final sentence with a 
punctuation mark. 
 My results for the annual_inc variable used in both model 1 and model 2 were very 
similar. My findings in both models show that for each time that the annual_inc variable 
increased by 1 standard deviation, the loam_amnt would increase by .004. Demonstrating a 
positive correlation between income and the requested loan amount to the total amount funded 
ratio. 
 Table 3 also shows that after running both regressions for both models, there were some 
similar results for the level of significance between the two models. Annual income for both 
models are highly significant; spelling errors are moderately significant, Interest rate for model 
1is moderately significant; grades for model 2 are moderately significant; and constant for both 
models have a low level of significance (See table 3).  
 In the first model, I used the dependent variable LetterG instead of interest rate, and my 
results show a correlation between LetterG and loan_amnt, similar to that of IntRt and loan_amnt 
of the second model. My results table show that for each time that the LetterG variable increased 
by 1 standard deviation, the loam_amnt would decrease by .015. 
 For my results from model 2, which incorporates interest rate as an independent variable, 
there were some unexpected findings. The results showed that for each time the IntRt variable 
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increased by 1 standard deviation, loan_amnt would decrease by .917. The impact IntRt variable 
had on funding was expected because higher interest rates are associated with riskier borrowers 
and lower interest rates are associated with more responsible borrowers, therefore, my results 
show that the riskier a borrower is, the less lenders are willing to fund their loans (decreasing the 
probability that their entire loan will be funded). 
 Unlike traditional banking, within LendingClub's peer to peer lending platform, there is a 
fixed interest rate that varies among borrowers and there is no discrimination involving interest 
rates, because interest rates are fixed based on what letter grade you are assigned by the platform. 
Although, in traditional banking there are many factors that play a role in the interest rate you 
receive on a loan, such as race, occupation, age, neighborhood. In the past, the majority of peer 
to peer loan applications have been for personal usage, such as, financing home improvements or 
paying off credit card debt. Although, recently the number of peer to peer lenders getting 
involved in the mortgage business has been increasingly growing (reaching more and more into 
traditional banking territory). That being said, for future research I hope to perform studies to test 
whether there is some correlation between the type projects loans are being requested for and the 
probability that their entire loan will be funded. Also, for the future of peer to peer lending I 
would like to see if someday will the type of projects loans are being requested for will have an 
impact on interest rates. For future research and improvement within the peer to peer lending 
market, I suggest improvement of the situation of asymmetric information. 
 
Section 6: Robustness: 
 I started off with one economic model that included both interest rate and letter grade, but 
after running a regression, I ran a VIF test which detected imperfect multicollinearity between 
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the two variables. This led me to splitting my one model into two, one model containing interest 
rate, but not letter grades as a variable, and the second model using letter grade as a variable but 
not interest rate. Then I ran the Park's test to test for the potential presence of heteroscedasticity, 
using annual income as a size variable. After running the Park's test, my results appeared to be 
heteroskedastic. Lastly, I ran the T-test to determine w ther he estimated coefficient is 
significantly different from zero. In my results from the T-test, the estimated t-value was greater 
than the critical t-value, forcing me to reject the null hypothesis that b  s equal to z ro. 
Section 7: Tables 
Table 1: 
Independent Variables Description 
ln(SpellingErr) Words in the loan description that are 
misspelled, not properly separated by a space, 
missing a capitalization, missing a 
hyphenation and misspelling that are 
homophone. Spell check is based on spelling 
errors detectable by Microsoft Word spell 
check and grammarcheckforsentence.com 
IntRt  The nominal interest rate borrowers must pay 
on their loan 
annual_inc  Self-reported annual income received 
sometimes verified or unverified 
LetterGr  Letter grade assigned to each borrower 
depending on their level of riskiness 
 
Table 2: 
Dependent Variables Description 
loan_amnt  Amount of money actually funded to borrower 
divided by amount of money requested by 
borrower (probability that an entire loan will 
be funded) 
 
Table 3: Regressions for 2007 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
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Annual Income .004* 
(.001) 
.004* 
(.001) 
ln(SpellingErr) -.703** 
(.701) 
-.703** 
(.704) 
Interest rate -.920** 
(.500) 
 
Letter grade  -.015** 
(.008) 
Constant 1.108*** 
(.059) 
1.050*** 
(.009) 
R-Squared 0.3128 0.3179 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.1071 0.1086 
N 94 94 
All standard errors are in parenthesis 
* indicates significance at 10% level of significance 
** indicates significance at 5% level of significance 
*** indicates significance at 1% level of significance 
 
Table 4: 2016 LendingClub Loan Grades 
Interest Rates 
Based on each loan application and credit 
report, every loan is assigned a grade ranging 
from A1 to G5 with a corresponding interest 
rate. Each loan grade and its corresponding 
interest rate is displayed below. 
Loan Grade Interest Rate 
A1 5.32% 
A2 6.99% 
A3 7.24% 
A4 7.49% 
A5 7.99% 
B1 8.24% 
B2 10.49% 
B3 11.39% 
B4 11.44% 
B5 11.49% 
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C1 12.74% 
C2 13.49% 
C3 13.99% 
C4 14.99% 
C5 15.99% 
D1 16.99% 
D2 17.99% 
D3 18.99% 
D4 19.99% 
D5 21.49% 
E1 22.74% 
E2 23.99% 
E3 24.74% 
E4 25.49% 
E5 26.24% 
F1 28.69% 
F2 29.49% 
F3 29.99% 
F4 30.49% 
F5 30.74% 
G1 30.79% 
G2 30.84% 
G3 30.89% 
G4 30.94% 
G5 30.99% 
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